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Abstract:
China’s interest in developing countries has exploded in the past decade as it continues to search
for resources to fuel high growth rates. This paper examines China’s activity in various resourcerich countries through the lens of the resource curse. What are the implications of China’s
involvement in developing countries in terms of the resource curse, and what factors or
circumstances determine whether a country will benefit from these strategic relations with
China? By viewing the resource curse in terms of specific challenges associated with resource
wealth rather than an overarching curse, I analyze how China’s involvement has altered the
severity of certain challenges in African and South American countries. While China has
provided economic booms and an alternative to western financial institutions, it has accentuated
the internal aspects of the resource curse. In the end, relative success of resource-rich countries
depends upon initial conditions, type of resource, country size and its ability to effectively
negotiate beneficial terms, investment in productive activity, and responsible fiscal management
including the use of stabilization funds.
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Introduction
China’s interest in the developing world has increased drastically as it looks to secure
strategic natural resources necessary to sustain the unprecedented growth levels that it has
experienced over the last 30 years. Natural resources lie at the heart of China’s ‘going out’
mindset which began in the 1990s. Not surprisingly, the developing countries most affected by
China over the last decade are those rich in natural resources. Many of these same countries,
such as Angola, Venezuela, Zimbabwe, and Zambia, have been countlessly cited as countries
who have suffered from the resource curse. Surprisingly there has been relatively little research
on how China’s activity may change the ‘cursed’ nature of many resource rich countries.
The guiding question for this paper is the following: what are the implications of China’s
involvement in developing countries in terms of the resource curse, and what factors or
circumstances determine whether a country will benefit from these strategic relations with
China? Considering the fact that many resource rich countries have been able to escape the
forces associated with the resource curse, it should clearly not be viewed as an intrinsic curse. A
more realistic approach to the resource curse is to view it as a set of developmental challenges
created by resource wealth. I break these challenges down into three categories: intrinsic,
internal, and external. Some authors have argued that external relationships have played a larger
role in the resource curse than often realized and therefore it is especially important that we work
to understand the effects of China’s growing activity in developing countries.
In this paper, I argue that China represents an external force in the resource curse. Its
complex engagement in developing countries, driven primarily by its growing demand for
natural resources, provides important economic opportunities for resource exporters in Africa
and South America, but reinforces many of the internal challenges associated with the resource
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curse. Relative success of resource
resource-rich countries depends upon initial conditions, type of
resource, country size and its ability to effectively negotiate beneficial terms, investment in
productive activity, and responsible fiscal management including the use of stab
stabilization
ilization funds.
Reconsidering the Resource Curse
The term ‘resource
resource curse”
curse”=’ has been used to describe the paradoxical phenomenon of
how resource-rich
rich developing countries tend to perform worse than those with fewer natural
resources. Strangely, resource wealth seems to inhibit economic development rather than fuel it.
Sachs and Warner
arner show that countries in which resource exports make up a large part of GDP
have experienced slower economic growth than their resource
resource-poor
poor counterparts.1 From this
observation, many authors have continued to investigate the problems and opportuninties
opportunintie
associated with resource wealth.

Correlation between GDP growth and resource abundance.2
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Main reasons for the resource curse
Many different political, social, and economic factors have been cited as reasons for why
resource wealth can have unintended consequences. For the purpose of this paper, I will use
Gonzalez-Vicente’s broad classifications of intrinsic, internal, and external aspects of the curse,
but change the details within each classification.3
Intrinsic aspects of the curse:
The intrinsic aspects of the curse consist of those that are inherent with resource
extraction. Humphreys, Sachs, and Stiglitz show that resource wealth is intrinsically different
from other sources of wealth for a number of reasons. Wealth from natural resources is extracted
rather than produced, meaning it is capital rather than labor intensive and wealth tends to accrue
to a relatively small minority. This naturally presents a problem in terms of wealth distribution.
Also being non-renewable in nature, resource extraction is essentially consumption of capital
rather than income.4 However, countries are often eager to extract in order to increase revenues
and do not view it as a consumption of capital. Following this logic there is a fundamental flaw
in natural resource accounting.
Although not completely inevitable, the incentive for rent-seeking greatly increases with
resource wealth. Rent is defined as the difference in the value of the resource and the cost of
extraction.5 This difference creates incentive for private and public stakeholders to act in any
means possible to capture the rent. By manipulating the political and social environments, these
actors derive rent rather than adding value to resources. Essentially, rent seeking distorts political
3
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and social incentives, and can have significant consequences in terms of corruption and conflict
which will be discussed it the following section.6
The last intrinsic aspects of the resource curse are environmental degradation and
resource depletion which, at some level, are nearly inevitable when countries depend heavily on
resource extraction.7
Internal aspects of the curse:
The internal aspects of the resource curse are composed of a variety of developmental
challenges often faced within resource-rich countries. First, rent seeking, discussed above, can
increase corruption and decrease political transparency, because as more resources are directed
to capturing profit, the incentive for opaque, corrupt behavior increases.8 The IMF estimates that
$1-5 billion in oil revenues goes missing every year in Angola, one of Africa’s most prominent
oil producers. 9 Corruption is not inevitable, but when the stakes are raised, the incentive for
corruption rises. Shaxon argues that countries dependent on oil wealth become divided and
increasingly vertical due to the great incentive for corruption.10
Second, theoretically, as a government becomes increasingly dependent on rent as a
source of revenue, its need for tax collection decreases, as well as its accountability to its
citizens.11 By decreasing the incentive for accountability, politicians have less of a need
represent its citizens in a democratic style. Oil-exporting states, specifically, are less likely to

Wick, K. “Contesting resources - rent seeking, conflict and the natural resource curse.” Public Choice 128, no.
3-4 (September 1, 2006): 457-476.
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become democratic than their non-oil exporting counterparts.12 Although Sachs dismisses the
claim that a link exists between resource abundance and authoritarian governments, there is
nevertheless an issue of institutional and political rigidity. Resource wealth enables governments
and institutions to stay in power even if it is not in the best interest of the citizens. Overall, there
tends to be a lack of institutional change in oil rich countries.13
Third, a link exits between resource abundance and conflict; oil-dependent countries are
more prone to corruption and conflict than others.14 There also tends to be higher rates of civil
war in resource dependent countries. Wick argues that the discovery of concentrated resources
can lead to a ‘conflict trap,’ which will make the entire country economy worse off.15 Most
importantly, as with rent-seeking, resource abundance can increase the incentive and opportunity
for conflict.16
Fourth, a heavy reliance on resource exports has significant effects on the national
economy. The Dutch Disease will be discussed in the following section, but in general, there
tends to be a ‘crowding out’ of productive, labor intensive industries. Sachs uses this crowding
out logic to describe how manufacturing and value-added industries are hurt in an economy
dominated by resource exports. Also, Hupmphreys discusses the trend of insufficient investment
in education and other forms of human capital because unlike manufactring economies, there are
lower returns on this type of investment when a country’s principle industries are capital
intensive.17
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Fifth, resource-rich countries tend to be highly unequal. This income inequality can stem
from a variety of sources. The capital intensive nature of resource extraction, especially nonagricultural commodities, tends to concentrate wealth in the hands of a few. Also, the crowding
out of labor intensive industries, discussed above, naturally creates a system of unequal income
distribution.18
External aspects of the resource curse:
The external aspects of the resource curse are those that are visible within the relationship
between resource exporting countries and the rest of the world. Dutch Disease is commonly cited
as one of these challenges. As the value of natural resource exports increases and revenues flow
into a country, there tends to be an appreciation of a country’s real exchange rate. In turn, other
goods and industries become more expensive to export. Also, important capital and labor are
often drawn away from manufacturing. A decline in the terms of trade has significant
implications for manufacturing and agriculture.19 Ross notes that, “Almost no resource-exporting
country has been able to prevent a rising exchange rate from undermining the international
competitiveness of its other sectors.”20
Due to the volatile nature of commodity prices, countries that are sufficiently dependent
on natural resource exports can be subject to crises when world prices plummet. This makes
long-term planning very difficult and has caused serious problems for countries that borrow
against the promise of future revenues.
Long term dependency remains a worry for many resource-exporting countries, and
should be considered within the external challenges of the resource curse. If resource-rich
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developing countries (in the periphery) rely on large resource exports to developed countries
(core), where these resources are used to produce more value-added goods, then the periphery
may be stuck in a systematic trap, making it very difficult to move up the value chain. Shubert
warns that an over dependence on oil exports is the main cause of the resource curse when it
comes to oil. 21 This will be an important point when looking at the long run implications of
China’s involvement in developing countries.
Besides these external factors, increasing attention has been given to how external events
and relationships shape the way in which resource-rich countries develop. Just one example is
Venezuela whose developmental woes since the 1970’s are not necessarily a product of its oil
production, but its tumultuous political and economic relationship with the United States.22
While these are the main challenges of the resource curse, to truly understand this phenomenon
we must look at why some countries have avoided these problems.
Why have some escaped the resource curse?
Rather than answering the question of why resource-rich countries have performed
poorly, perhaps the more important question is why have some been able to escape the curse?
Why have Norway, Botswan, Indonesia, and others performed so well while many other resource
exporters have struggled so badly to develop?
A number of authors argue that initial conditions upon resource exploration determine the
development performance of resource exporting countries. Choge argues that Indonesia was
surprisingly successful between the 50’s and 90’s, compared to countries like Nigeria, because of
initial political and social conditions. Indonesia had been subject to fluctuations in food prices
and therefore was already promoting its agricultural sector. Also, from the beginning,
21
22
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Indonesia’s government was focused on poverty alleviation which helped limit inequality
growth. Lastly, the fact that the commercial elites in Indonesia were primarily Chinese made the
government naturally cautious about its commercial interactions. This helped to avoid corrupt
business-government relationships. 23 Similarly, Hamond argues that Venezuela’s political
conditions at the time of oil discovery have helped it effectively avoid some of the main aspects
of the resource curse.24 Torvik notices that presidential governments tend to be more suceptible
to special interests, while parliamentary governments tend to be better suited for avoiding special
interests.25
Institutional quality, a tough measure to quantify, is an important aspect of the ‘initial
conditions’ argument. Torvik discusses the importance of strong institutions and the protection
of property rights. He adds to this by showing that countries which have already industrialized
tend to have better institutions and can better manage resource wealth.26 Larsen points out that
Norway has been relatively successful due to its strong judicial system, developed political and
economic institutions, and lack of corruption.27 Most importantly, the resource curse is not
inevitable and initial conditions have been a major determinant of developmental success for
resource-rich countries.
The use of resource revenues tends to be an important factor in escaping the resource
curse. How is the money invested, spent, or saved? Some argue for the need to use resource
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revenues for public investment in infratructure and education.28 Norway’s investment in
education and R&D has been crucial in escaping the negative effects of the resource curse.
Through heavy investment in offshore drilling technology, Norway has used its oil wealth to
become a leader in this high-tech industry.29 Dietz uses a measurement for sustainable
development called ‘genuine savings,’ to show that the countries who have fallen trap to the
resource curse have invested relatively little in productive capital while not saving enough
revenue. The countries who are most actively investing in productive capital will be those that
will receive the greatest benefit from China’s involvement.
Since resource-rich countries often suffer from high inequality some argue that
redistributive policies, like those being used in Venezuela, are necessary to ensure that the
population is able to benefit from wealth that accrues to a small sector.30 Others however,
remain skeptical of redistributive policies, arguing that such policies foster dependence,
corruption, and the Dutch disease.31 Although Venezuela’s Chavez has embraced redistributive
policies, considering the country’s condition, there is question whether the country has actually
escaped the resource curse.
Within the topic of revenue use, stabilization funds have become widely accepted as a
sound management tool. Stabilization funds allow countries to save when commodity prices are
high and spend when things get tough. Protection from price volatility has been crucial in the
success of Norway and Chile.32 Although there appears to be controversy about how revenues
should be redistributed or used for development projects, there seems to be a consensus that
28
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sound macro-economic policy, consisting of stabilization funds and investment in productive
capital, is critical in escaping the resource curse.
Other explanations for the variation in economic performance cite the type of resource
and external forces as being an important determinant. To add to the paradoxical nature of the
resource curse, oil and valuable metals appear to have a larger effect upon growth than less
valuable commodities.33 Wick supplements this observation by looking at the ‘pointiness’ of a
resource. When resources are geographically concentrated in a country (especially ‘pointy’), as
oil is, the financial benefits acrue to a relatively small population and thus national inequlity
increases. Wick argues that if a resource is sufficiently ‘pointy’ it can make the whole economy
worse off.34
Increasingly, literature is beginning to offer alternative explanations for the resource
curse. Mexico, Venezuela, and Angola all export natural resources and have experienced large
economic crises at some point in the last 40 years. However, these crises can be largely
explained by external forces and shocks that each experienced.35
Initial conditions and external forces may be a larger part of the resource curse than often
realized. Many authors are quick to point out the apparent factors of the resource curse, such as
rent-seeking and corruption, but fail to recognize how political and economic conditions are the
main determinant of a country’s ability to manage the negative forces of the resource curse.
Torvik calls for more research on the effect of external relationships within the resource curse.
This is why it is critical that we understand China’s increased activity the developing world.
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Most importantly, given the fact that many countries have escaped the resource curse, it should
not be viewed as an intrinsic disease associated with resource abundance.
Resource Curse: Criticisms and Conclusions
The resource curse continues to be a hotly debated topic as scholars fight over how
natural resources actually effect economic development. On the extreme side, Alexeev
challenges the very existence of the curse as many have described it, and argues that resource
wealth helps rather than impedes long term growth. Nevertheless, he asserts that mineral wealth
may still have negative consequences.36
There have also been criticisms of the resource curse discourse. While there are a variety
of challenges associated with resource abundance, it is certainly not an intrinsic rule that
resource exporters are destined to suffer from slow economic growth, corruption, and an
undiversified economy. Naim is correct in arguing that the topic is too often talked about as an
all or nothing curse with only one solution.37 There will never be one, unique solution to this
phenomenon because the curse is made up of a multitude of political, economic, and social
factors which are different in nearly every country. The numerous examples of countries that
have escaped the resource curse show that poor development is surely not inevitable.38
Overall the resource curse has been generalized to include every possible negative trend
observed within resource-rich countries. In reality, the resource curse is nothing more than a
human created phonomenon. It is a complex set of developmental challenges that have been
grouped together under one stylized name.
China: Changing the Game
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For the purpose of this paper, I am interested in China’s activity in developing countries,
and how China alters the principle challenges of the resource curse. Viewing China’s activity
through the lens of the resource curse is especially effective considering the fact that much of its
foreign activity is driven by its growing demand for natural resources. There is no question that
China’s global interest has grown significantly over the last few decades through aid programs,
foreign investment, and trade. However, there seems to be a lack of understanding about exactly
what China is doing as it expands globally. In order to understand China’s foreign activity, it is
necessary to understand the goals and incentives driving its ‘going out’ mindset.
There seems to be five central goals driving much of China’s geo-economic strategy.
First, China’s unprecedented growth has led to high demand for natural resources, and in order to
maintain current growth rates, the country is trying to ensure access to critical natural resources.
Nineteen ninety three marked a landmark change, as China went from being a net exporter of oil
to a net importer. Since then, the gap between supply and demand has only widened, as oil
consumption doubled between 1995 and 2005.39 Many authors have cited the need for raw
materials to maintain current growth and support a rising middle class as the main driver of
Chinese trade and investment.40 Undoubtedly, China’s resource and energy insecurity is an
important motive in its foreign activity, and this raises questions about the implications for
countries at risk of suffering from the resource curse.
Second, China is trying to recycle massive foreign exchange reserves into strategically
profitable investments. Third, China’s growth has led to expansion into new markets across the
globe; Africa and Latin America have become important markets for Chinese products. Fourth,
China is trying to facilitate the development of globally competitive multinational corporations
39
40
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as the likes of China’s National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), China’s National Offshore Oil
Corporation (CNOOC), Sinopec, and others have dramatically increased their global presence.
Chen argues that the promotion of these oil corporations has been a critical component of
China’s ‘oil diplomacy.”41 Fifth, there has been a push to secure and develop agricultural land in
other countries in order to supply Chinese industry and consumers. China’s interest in African
cotton and South American soy has dramatically increased as it struggles to feed its growing
demand.42 Although these five goals are economic in nature, I do not mean to say there are no
other motives involved. For example, China has strived to raise its profile in the international
community and has aided some countries, such as Costa Rica, in order to gain diplomatic
recognition over Taiwan. China’s political motives should not be overlooked, but the five
economic goals outlined above are the main drivers of China’s interest in resource exporting
countries.43
While China began to open up in the late 1970s, China’s reforms in the 1990s and early
2000s laid the path for the new wave of foreign activity that we see today. These reforms tied
together aid, investment, and trade activity while promoting competition and efficiency through
the use of government funds. In 1994, the China Development Bank and China Export Import
Bank were created as tools for the government to distribute targeted finance. Brautigam
emphasizes the fact that China is essentially an East Asian ‘developmental state’ in that it
accelerates development through the deliberate use of state policy. This has been critical to
China’s development. Also, some of the large companies owned by China’s ministries began to
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separate in the 1990s and become increasingly independent. These newly independent firms
began to look outward as they could no longer rely on state funding. Along with policy banks
and independent companies, there was clear initiative in the mid 1990s by Chinese leaders to
support programs which combined economic cooperation with aid. 44
China’s business model, which is often backed by government funding, allows
companies to pursue long term investments that many western companies, buoyed by the desires
of shareholders, are unwilling to consider. These strategic investments in energy resources and
infrastructure in developing countries, may have a period of extended losses, but will help secure
valuable resources in the coming decades.45
China’s strategic linkage of trade, investment, and aid has made it somewhat difficult to
decipher which is which. Many authors have pointed out the difficulty in quantifying China’s
foreign aid due to the fact that the People’s Republic of China does not release these numbers.
Estimates really depend on the definition of aid because if concessional loans, and state
sponsored foreign investment is included, the PRC is a very significant global provider of aid.46
By focusing on specific activity in African and Latin American countries, we can better
understand the potential implications of China’s actions.
China’s Involvement in Africa
The importance of China’s involvement in Africa cannot be underestimated; as one
author argues, “China’s impact on Africa – and the rest of the world – is the biggest geopolitical
shift of the early twenty first century.”47 China has been present in Africa throughout history, but
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its activity in the continent has dramatically increased in recent decades as growing industry has
demanded more natural resources. Africa-China trade has increased from $5.6 billion in 1996 to
over $100 billion in 2010, which demonstrates the growing importance of China in Africa.48
Considering Africa’s historical experiences with imperialism, China’s heavy involvement fueled
by its desire to secure resources makes many worry that China may represent a reworking of past
imperialist relationships.
China’s Involvement in Latin America
Over the last decade, trade between China and Latin America has grown faster than trade
between any two regions, and the region is quickly becoming one of China’s main suppliers of
raw materials. Excluding oil and natural gas, Latin America is already China’s largest
commodities supplier. The region supplies more than half of China’s imported soybeans, copper,
fish, meat, and sugar while also providing a significant portion of many other materials
including: iron ore, lead, zinc, and leather.49 While much of the literature about China in Latin
America focuses on the whole of Latin America, Gallagher asserts that in reality the vast
majority of Chinese-Latin America economic activity is concentrated in 6 countries and 10
industries. These industries are all raw materials.
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Concentration of Latin America-China trade.50

Gallagher argues that China plays an important role in global resource consumption, but
surprisingly only accounts for only 3.8% of Latin American Countries’ exports.51 While this
seems to undermine the importance of China in the region, it is important to note that China
accounts for a significant amount Latin America’s recent export growth. Also, its influence has
been concentrated in a handful of countries. The last decade of growth for Latin America can
largely be tied to Chinese demand and high commodity prices, for commodities account for 70%
of export growth in the region. 52 China’s investment in Latin America’s natural resources
generates important questions about de-industrialization and long term dependency. Latin
50
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American countries face many of the same challenges and opportunities as their African
counterparts when it comes to Chinese involvement, but there are also some important
disparities.
Rather than presenting an overview all of China’s significant aid, investment, and trade in
Africa and Latin America, I will focus on a few case studies in each continent which illustrate
the critical implications of Chinese involvement. These examples are strategically placed to
understand how China is changing the forces of the resource curse and to explain which
countries are best placed to benefit from China’s involvement.
How China Changes the Resource Curse
In a similar paper, which views China’s engagement through the perspective of the
resource curse, Gonzalez-Vicente compares China’s impact on the intrinsic, internal, and
external curses in Latin America to its impact on those curses in Africa. He concludes that
besides environmental degradation and new economic opportunities, China’s effect on African
countries is quite different from its effect on South American countries.53 The fundamental
difference between this paper and his, is the definition of the resource curse and the intrinsic,
internal, and external categories. In the end it is too broad to starkly differentiate between the
implications in Africa and Latin America. The section on which countries benefit from China’s
engagement could help explain any broad differences between the two continents.
Changing the Intrinsic Aspects
The intrinsic aspects of the resource curse remain relatively unchanged through China’s
engagement in resource-rich countries. This is because China does not change the fundamentals
of resource extraction. On a broad scale one could argue that China’s massive demand
53
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accelerates inevitable resource depletion and environmental degradation. 54 Also, China’s model
of infrastructure investment in return for access to resources could be seen as a new form of rent
seeking with its own consequences. However, China’s biggest effects come in the internal and
external aspects of the resource curse.
Changing the Internal Aspects
China intensifies a number of internal challenges associated with the resource curse.
First, its willingness to engage with any type of government through its non-interference policy
allows and ensures corruption in countries without the necessary means to fight it. Second,
Chinese investment may worsen the problem of accountability that is seen in many resource-rich
countries. Third, many argue that China’s investment model brings few benefits to the host
country’s economy. Fourth, China is crowding out out labor intensive industries such as
manufacturing that are often critical to development. Fifth, China’s massive demand helps to
prop up corrupt leaders and creates a system of institutional rigidity in which there is no
incentive for institutional development .The following case studies help illustrate the
intensification of these internal challenges.
Angola-model
Kaplinsky uses the term ‘Angola-Model’ to generalize about the actions of Chinese
SOE’s in Sub-Saharan Africa. At a basic level, the model involves first, providing attractive lines
of credit for infrastructure and resource extraction projects. Then, Chinese firms pursue these
projects while relying primarily upon Chinese inputs and Chinese labor. In the end, a large
amount of the funding never actually leaves China, but is just transferred to large Chinese firms.
An example of this is the refurbishment of Angolan railways which mainly has provided an
expedited connection between resource extraction sites (specifically copper and natural gas) and
54
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Angolan ports.55 Beyond the addition of lacking infrastructure, serious questions are being asked
about how Angola can benefit when China’s involvement is focused largely on resource
extraction and engages little of the Angolan economy. The use of Chinese inputs and labor in
construction projects in Africa essentially means that the majority of the money is simply
recirculated through Chinese businesses.
Also, China has done nothing to change political incentives for corrupt behavior in
Angola. In a paper unrelated to China’s impact, Hammond argues that Angola has fallen victim
to the resource curse because pre-existing political conditions led to problematic resource
allocation and misguided economic decisions.56 Although these conditions are beginning to
improve since end of the civil war in 2002, China’s non-interference stance has done nothing to
change the incentives for corrupt political behavior. The IMF estimates than $1-5 billion in oil
revenues goes missing every year in Angola, and although transparency has begun to improve in
the last decade, China has had little to do with this.57 As Angola becomes more dependent on
China there is no reason to believe that corruption, little transparency, or inequality will come to
an end. The short discussion above illustrates that China reinforces existing institutions and
helps to create a system of institutional rigidity. In Angola, a country still rife with corruption
and inequality, there continues to be little incentive to change these conditions.
China’s non-interference policy has serious internal implications depending on the
conditions within a country. In fact, due to its willingness to do business with practically any
country, China may be able to benefit most in countries with corrupt leaders; “ It is no surprise
that the African governments that have received most from China are those that are oil rich but
55
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the least open and the worst in terms of corruption, war and human rights abuses: Sudan, Angola,
and Congo.”58 This non-interference policy has grave consequences in terms of institutional
rigidity and incentive for corrupt behavior.
The 88 Queensway Group
The story of the 88 Queensway Group (Queensway Syndicate), illustrates how China is
accentuating many concerns about transparency, corruption, and accountability in some
resource-rich countries. This group is made up of a number of subsidiary companies all based out
of the same Beijing address. What is known is that the group has been active in countries around
the world, but has concentrated on Africa where it has signed billions of dollars of contracts for
oil, minerals, and diamonds. Recently it purchased valuable Manhattan real estate worth billions
of dollars, including the JP Morgan Chase Building in downtown Manhattan. The group remains
shrouded in secrecy as little is known about the leadership structure and the financial assets of
the group. It is impossible to know who is really benefiting. There is little evidence suggesting
the company is an arm of the state, but many suspect that some of the group’s personnel have
connections to Ministries within government.59
A report by the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission attempts to
understand the role of this group within China’s going out strategy, and shows that China’s
engagement in some developing countries is more complex than many recognize. In 2004, the
Chinese businessman suspected to be in charge, persuaded elites to create a joint venture in
Angola, China Sonangol, which would channel oil through China. The details of the agreement
have never been released, and key statistics are missing on this massive business venture. When
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the contract was signed oil traded at $55/barrel, and now the Brent Crude is trading above
$100/barrel; however there seems to be no change in the original contract. This leads us to
believe that the company is making incredible profit while Angola receives a fraction of what its
resources are worth. As China Sonangol operates in an extremely opaque manner with its
president being the son of Angola’s president, it seems as though cozy political relationships and
corruption lie at the heart of business.
While Angola seems to be most pursued company by the 88 Queensway Group, there
have been important connections to Guinea and Zimbabwe. For example, in Guinea the African
Development Corporation won the rights to mineral concessions in return for investment up to
$7 billion in infrastructure. The promise of infrastructure investments tends to be a large part of
the group’s investment strategy. However often these promises are left unfulfilled. Zimbabwe
and Guinea continue to wait for much of the infrastructure they were initially promised.
While there are still a number of questions waiting to be answered about this group of
firms, there is no doubt that it holds considerable financial power and maintains a complicated
spot within China’s going out strategy. The lack of transparency poses significant challenges to
countries such as Angola where resources have been historically mismanaged. Also, as
authoritarian leaders continue to receive funding in places like Zimbabwe, the institutional
rigidity, discussed with the resource curse, is most likely to continue. Overall, the 88 Queensway
Group illustrates that Chinese engagements in Africa are far more complex and possibly
unknown than often realized.60 Clearly the actions of a firm such as this have considerable
implications on the internal challenges of the resource curse.
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Venezuela: Chavez, Oil, and China
Although there is controversy over whether Venezuela has escaped the main challenges
of the resource curse, due to its large endowments of oil, Venezuela’s history is often cited
within literature on the resource curse.61 As the region’s second largest oil producer, China’s
interest in Venezuela stems mainly from its desire to secure strategic energy resources. In 2008
Hugo Chavez signed an agreement to triple its oil exports to China to 1 million barrels/day by
2012, and has since expressed his desire to reach that target sooner.
While the reason for China’s interest may be obvious, Hugo Chavez looks to decrease
dependence on Western markets by shifting exports to China. China’s high demand for oil and
willingness to purue business partnerships with Venezuelan companies greatly enables what
Chavez is doing. There are a number of issues involved in Venezuela’s experience, but in
regards to the internal aspects of the resource curse, China essentially helps prop up Chavez’s
legitimacy. Within this lies the trend of political and institutional rigidity, for China ensures the
continuation of Chavez’s political regime. In a country already rampant with corruption, China’s
non-interference policy will do nothing but further the corrupt behavior.
Nevertheless, China’s internal impacts are not only negative. For example, in 2001,
PDVSA (Venezuela’s state owned oil company) and China National Petroleum Corporation
(CNPC) established a joint venture company which has since split into different mixedownership companies aimed at specific oil extraction projects. These projects have even begun to
expand outside the realms of either country, showing that business lies at the heart of this
relationship. Along with joint oil ventures, the two countries created a fund to invest in non-oil
related plans in Venezuela, which doubled in 2009, to over $12 billion.62Also, China has

61
62

Hammond (2007)
Iturre (2010)

23

provided technological opportunities outide of oil. Recently China helped build and launch
Venezuela’s first satellite which could potentially bridge the gap between urban and rural
Venezuela by providing rural populations access to educational and medical information.63
In regards to the internal challenges of the resource curse, China presents some economic
opportunites in Venezuela while intensifying many of the traditional internal worries associated
with resource wealth.
China in Brazil
As a fellow BRIC country and rapidly emerging economy, Brazil faces different
implications from China’s recent involvement than almost any other country. As with
Venezuela’s Chavez, Brazil’s former president Lula looked to build a strategic relationship with
Beijing, and in 2009 China replaced the US as Brazil’s number one trading partner.64 Last year
China provided more than 1/3 of Brazil’s total FDI, and 85% of that went towards natural
resources.65 Clearly, China’s importance in the country cannot be underestimated. Along with
the other countries discussed in this paper, China’s interest in Brazil stems mainly from its
demand for raw materials. Brazil has become an important provider of oil, soybeans, iron, meat
and paper for China’s expanding economy.
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Growth in Trade between China and Brazil.66

Skepticism seems to be growing within Brazil concerning China’s involvement and much
of this emanates from a flood of Chinese goods into the economy. Brazil has filed anti-dumping
anti
lawsuits, as many argue that China has gained a market share in high tech and labor intensive
industries by dumping their goods into the Brazilian economy at ar
artificially
tificially low prices. While
China may be represent an important export market for Brazil’s resources, there are worries that
imports from China are leading to a ‘deindustrialization’ of the economy.67
China’s threat to manufacturing may be Brazil’s bigge
biggest
st concern when it comes to
resource curse challenges. A booming demand for soybeans pushed Brazil’s real exchange rate
up 12% since
ce 2003, and as discussed earlier, inflation can put a burden on non-commodity
commodity
exporters. During a period which saw a doubling of commodity exports, Brazil’s manufacturing
has decreased from 58% of exports to only 38% in the last decade. Coupled with a new wave of
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Chinese competition at home and abroad, China seems to be impeding Brazil’s ability to
effectively diversify and add value to its exports. While China and many East Asian countries
have experienced rapid development using export oriented policies, the author of one study
argues that this model is impossible for many countries like Brazil because of China’s
overwhelming competitiveness.68 China has stiffled potential development of labor intensive
industries in Brazil, and has created concerns about Brazil’s long-term competitiveness in many
of these industries. Sachs argues that resource wealth essentially crowds out productive activity
such as labor intensive industries, education, and innovation. China’s growing demand and its
search for markets in which to sell its goods, has strengthened this crowding out effect. In Brazil
and many other Latin American countries, labor intensive industries have struggled and there
seems to be stagnation in terms of value added exports.69
The stories of Angola, the 88 Queensway Group, Venezuela, and Brazil show the ways in
which China intensifies the internal challenges associated with the resource curse. In some cases,
such as Venezuela, China helps to create business opportunites that would otherwise not be
realized. Nonetheless, China appears to increase many of the internal challenges outlined in the
initial part of this paper.
Changing the External Aspects
China represents an external force for many resource exporting countries. When
considering the external challenges of the resource curse, such as dependency, Dutch Disease,
and price volatility, the benefits created from China’s engagement seem to outweigh the costs.
First, China’s growing demand has pushed up commodity prices and helped to create imporant
economic opportunites for many resource-rich countries. Extra revenue collected in the last ten
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years has been pivotal in alleviating the pressure of external debt for some countries. Second,
China represents an alternative to Western demands, and in some cases has replaced the IMF as
an international lender. Third, although there are no immediate concerns over dependence due to
China’s growing economy, these countries will face problems of dependency in the coming
decades.
China in Zambia
Chinese investment in Zambia is in no sense a recent phenomenon and was made famous
by the Tanzam Railway in the 1970s. However, with China’s renewed interest in Africa, Zambia
has become the most heavily affected country, creating both opportunity and controversy.70

Growth in Chinese investment in Zambia71

China has helped revive Zambian copper mining through massive state-led investments.
There is no doubt that China’s hunger for resources, and specifically copper, has driven the
recent resurgence of Chinese investment in Zambia. Zambia’s Chabishi copper mine was closed
for more than 10 years when China Non-Ferrous metals Corporation bought the mine and
invested over $130 million to restore it. Employing over 1000 Zambians, the project appeared as
a success until safety concerns began to surface. An explosion in 2005 killed 51 employees at the
mine, fueling a negative reaction. However, some authors have noted that the Chinese mine has
been safer on average than the Mopani copper mines, a Swiss-Canadian-Zambian joint venture.
While criticism has focused on China’s lax safety standards and poor job creation for Zambians,
70
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China has been instrumental in reviving a key part of Zambia’s economy.72 In an analysis of
Chinese investment in Zambian mining and construction industries, Kragelund concludes that
Chinese investment is not very different from that of other countries, but has triggered local
reactions due to the sheer size and growth of its investments. 73 This could be the case for many
other countries, where the surge of Chinese involvement is producing reactions of all sorts.
China has also helped to create the Zambia – China special economic zone, which has
produced thousands of jobs and helped the competitiveness of Zambia’s manufacturing sector.
Allowing manufacturers to import and export goods without duty, helps to diversify an economy
in danger of falling trap to the resource curse. 74 While an over dependence on resource exports
can make it difficult for labor intensive industries to succeed, China has been instrumental in
helping Zambia begin to escape this trap. Though there are certainly concerns over China’s
involvement in Zambia, these examples demonstrate some of the economic opportunities China
is able to provide.
China: an alternative to the IMF
Angola is consistently cited within the resource curse literature as an example of a
country rife with natural resources, corruption, conflict, and inequality.75 A civil war beginning
in the 1960s lasted until 2002 and was largely a fight for control over diamonds and energy
resources. The Angolan President, Jose Eduardo dos Santos financed the war through oil backed
loans and with funds linked directly to resource revenues. As the war came to an end, the country
was heavily indebted and global financial institutions such as the IMF began to lend with strict
reform requirements. After repeatedly failing to meet many IMF demands for reforms such as
72
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trade liberalization, higher income taxes, and increased transparency, China entered the picture
as donor.
China entered a war-torn, corruption filled Angola and imposed no demands for political
reform. Naturally the critics have argued that China not only allows, but ensures, the
continuation Angola’s problems.
While many have focused on this negative perspective on China’s engagement,
Brautigam notes that this is too simple of an analysis. In fact it was Western banks that enabled
Angola to receive oil backed loans throughout the years of civil war, and there seemed to be no
sign of improvements in governance as the IMF tried to impose strict demands for reform. In
2004, China’s Exim Bank began offering oil backed loans almost identical to those being offered
by Western donors; however there was one important difference. The Chinese loans were offered
at a lower interest rate, involved longer repayment schedules, and offered more generous grace
periods.76 The often criticized Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) of the IMF have in some
ways hand cuffed developing countries as they attempt to pay of their debt, but China has begun
to offer similar loans without the strict demand for reform. In this way China is drastically
changing the global financial community.
Venezuela is another example of a country that has gained indpenendence from Western
demands through China’s involvement. While China’s interest lies in securing oil, Hugo Chavez
looks to decrease dependence on Western markets by shifting exports to China. Considering
Venezuela’s historically tumultuous relationship with the United States, China embodies a
political and economic alternative to Western demands. As Li point out, China represents a
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special opportunity for Venezuela, for China could have a large effect on the economic success
of Venezuela and thus the continuation of anti-American policy in Venezuela.77
In Angola and Venezuela, China’s attractive loans and investments offer a substitute to
the neoliberal reforms so often pushed by the Bretton Woods financial institutions.78 Also, China
represents a business partner which is genuinely interested in creating profitable ventures with
various resource exporting countries, rather than the United States where these countries often
receive little attention.
Brazil’s Iron
Half of the world’s iron ore goes to China, and Brazil provides more than half of that.79
While many commodity prices have surged in the last decade, a surge would be an
understatement for iron ore. The price of iron ore has increased from $13/ton in 2001 to $178/ton
(nearly a 14 fold increase), and China is to thank for much of this.80 Brazil’s iron producers have
flourished due to this price hike, but dependency has become a concern. A recent study that
measures resource dependency by resource and by country, determined that Brazil’s iron ore
dependence on Chinese markets doubled between 2002 and 2009. This commodity dependence
is the second highest on the index for all of Latin America, behind only Argentina’s soy
exports.81 Considering dependency is a key factor within the external aspects of the resource
curse, this is could potentially be dangerous for the long term development goals of Brazil. As
Brazil works to diversify its economy and switch to more value added exports, this may pose a
challenge, especially if the price surge for iron is only temporary. Paus and others argue that
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there is little evidence pointing to an increase in value added exports from many Latin American
countries.82 The future implications of this dependency depend largely on China’s development
path, which will be briefly discussed later in the paper.
Overall, China seems to be doing more benefit than harm when considering the external
challenges of the resource curse. China has brought about unmatched economic opportunities
and its trade, investment, and aid represent an alternative to Western demands which have
bogged down many developing countries. There are some external concerns regarding China’s
involvement, such as dependency and Dutch Disease, but the benefits seem to outweigh these at
the moment.
A Beijing Consensus?
While China may represent a new trading partner, the idea that China is spreading a new
model for development, is simply misguided.83 The ‘Beijing Consensus’ is an idea created by
western scholars which argues that China has its own version of the Washington Consensus. But
this has not been seen in practice. First of all, due to China’s size and evolving development
experience, it provides no model that other countries can effectively follow. Second, the Beijing
consensus as often described does not accurately reflect China’s experience, for Kennedy argues
that China’s policies actually closely followed 8 of the 10 central elements of the original
Washington Consensus.84 Rather than spreading a new developmental model through its foreign
interactions, Bautigam notes that China’s foreign aid and investments are identical to those of
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Japan’s in China in the 1980s.85 Although I noted that China has created an alternative to
Western demands, I am in no way claiming that China is spreading a new model of development.
Unlike the Washington Consensus in which the US imposes its desire for democracy and free
market on developing countries, China is non-interventionist by nature. There is no such thing as
the Beijing Consensus, but China may be slightly changing how the world views development
due to the fact that it has experienced decades of high growth rates through the use of state
intervention in the economy.
Which Countries benefit from China’s Engagement?
The countries that are able to receive the most benefit from China’s involvement are
those who are best positioned to take advantage of the economic opportunities that China
presents while mitigating many of the intensified internal challenges associated with the resource
curse. Many of the factors which determine which countries have escaped the resource curse,
discussed in the beginning of the paper, apply to who benefit from China’s engagement. These
factors include: intitial conditions, institutional quality, type of resource, level of investment in
productive activity, and responsible fiscal management through the use of stabilization funds.
First, the level of corruption, conflict, and inequality currently present in a country before
China’s involvement will have a significant impact on the future development of the country. For
example, when comparing countries like Chile and Angola, Chile is superior in all of the above
categories, and therefore will have an easier time mitigating some of the internal challenges that
can be intensified through China’s intervention.
Second, as mentioned earlier in this paper, an especially pointy resource creates more
challenges than those which are more evenly distributed across the country. For example,
China’s high demand for Brazilian soy creates greater benefit for Brazil as a whole compared to
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China’s demand for Angolan oil which tends to be concentrated and controlled by a small sector
of soceity.
Third, in order to combat long term dependency, there must be a concerted focus on on
diversification in order avoid any sort of de-industrialization that could occur.86 Along with
diversification, reinvestment of revenues into productive capital such as education and research
and development has helped Norway and others escape the resource curse.87 One option is to
invest in adding value to resources before they are exported. Investment in refining oil and iron
in Brazil would add value to both types of resources while developing more high-tech industries.
Those countries that are able to use the economic opportunites presented to China to invest in
productive activity elsewhere in the economy will be those that will be able to experience
sustainable long-term development.
Fourth, perhaps the most important determinant of development success depends on a
countries responsible economic mangagment. Overborrowing and unsustainable spending have
plaugued many resource-rich countries through out the past. There are many aspects within
responsible economic management, but I will focus on the use of stabilzation funds.
Chile’s Copper Stabilization Fund
Chile may be well positioned to benefit from China’s involvement while effectively
mitigating the related challenges of the Dutch Disease, volatility, and poor fiscal management.
Copper has driven Chile’s trade with China, and Chile has been exemplary for other resource
exporters through its creation of a Copper Stabilization Fund. The structural surplus rule built
into the stabilzation fund has focused fiscal policy on long term sustainability by limiting public
expenditure to be consistent with long term income levels and copper prices. The fund has
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proved effective in creating stability by saving during a booms and spending during downturns.
The structure of the fund, reduces interest rate volatility, improves confidence in sovereign debt,
and reduces exchange rate volatility.88
While many stabilization funds exist in resource exporting countries, the structural
surplus rule created by Chile has been especially effective in controlling the negative inflation
and volatility effects of resource exports. Chile’s model applies to the good times and the bad
with an emphasis on long run stability. These policies enable Chile to benefit from China’s
involvement and should be taken as a model for other resource-rich countries.
The last factor that will determine relative development success is slightly different than
the others. The size of a country, and its ability to effectively negotiate beneficial terms with
China has a significant impact. For example, the size of a country like Brazil enables it to take a
firmer stance in negotiations with China and thus receive greater benefit. In 2010 when China
tried to buy hundreds of thousands of acres of land in Brazil for soy production, an outrage in
Brazil led to an agreement promising continued supply but no land.89 Monica Dehart noted that
Brazil’s size, bargaining position, democratic institutions, and relatively diversified economy
enables the country to benefit from China’s engagement while mitigating the challenges
associated with the resource curse.90 Also Brazil’s low export/GDP ratio (2%) means that the
country will be less affected by China compared to many other countries where exports make up
a larger portion of GDP.91
Theoretical perceptions of China’s involvement

88

China Economic Quarterly (2011)
“Latin America: Partner or Provider” (2011)
90
Dehart, M. Interview. (Oct 7, 2011) Tacoma, Wa.
91
China Economic Quarterly (2011), 36
89

34

This paper examines the implications of China’s development for resource-rich countries,
but the perception of these implications could differ depending on one’s theoretical perspective.
Liberalism, realism, and structuralism all take differing views on this issue. First, from a liberal
perspective, China’s resource demand helps to boost the position of developing countries in the
global economy, and does so best in a free market economy. For authors that take this
perspective, the internal challenges often associated with the resource curse are of little
importance compared to the economic opportunity created by Chinese demand.92 Also, under the
liber perspective, any sort of government intervention in the economy tends to be frowned upon,
therefore reditributive policies and targeted finance is viewed as an inefficient use of resource
revenues. Although this appears to be a harsh stance, some authors that heavily focus on the
economic benefits created by China, while ignoring the internal challenges, could be seen as
taking a more liberal stance on the topic.
Second, a realist approach tends to focus on protection of state interests, and is wary of
China’s potential impact on domestic industry. Such an approach would argue that China poses a
significant threat to domestic industry, and specifically manufacturing. Authors that take this
view do not oppose free economic trade, but believe protection of infant industries should be an
important goal of developing countries.93 In this case the realist perspective promotes
government intervention to help diversify ones economy and aid industries that could potentially
be harmed by China’s involvement.
Third, the structuralist perspective is especially concerned about the problem of long term
dependency on China. As resource-rich developing countries continue to send more resources to
China, they are esentially entering into a structural trap that is tough to be broken. Exploitation is
92
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a central concern within this perspective Many of the countries discussed in this paper could be
considered within the periphery while China is a core country that is sucking up the resources of
the periphery in order to produce more valuable goods. Authors that take this approach tend to be
wary of long term dependence, for it may become increasingly difficult to produce value-added
goods if these developing countries become over dependent on exporting resources. It should be
noted that the implications of China’s involvment can be viewed very differently depending on
one’s theoretical approach.
Long term prospects
Economic booms experienced in resource exporting countries over the last 10 years have
fueled optimism regarding the role of China. However, high demand and record-level prices
have also led to greater dependence on resource exports. Ferchen analyzes the complementarity
and dependency between Latin American resource exporters and China arguing that the
relationship is complementary only in the short run.94 Will China’s growth slow as it begins to
move away from labor-intensive industries towards capital intensive industries? Some argue that
there are still plenty of areas in which China can achieve growth and they hold confidence that
China will continue with its near 10% growth for at least another ten years.95 However, recent
evidence points to a slowing due largely to the global financial crisis which hampers demand for
Chinese products.96 Whether its 5, 10, or 30 years down the line, China’s demand is sure to slow
at some point.
Carmody argues that as China moves away from its intense focus on manufacturing,
some of this may shift to Africa, enabling African nations to adopt more of an export-oriented
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model for development similar to that of many East Asian countries.97 Others are less optimistic
for many developing nations. A recent study argues that Latin American countries will never be
able to specialize in export-oriented manufacturing due to China’s overwhelming
competitiveness and its advantages in labor, low wages, and a large educated population. We can
only speculate about future implications, but its safe to say that the countries which have begun
to diversify and invest in other productive forms of capital will be well positioned if Chinese
demand begins to slow.
Conclusions
Considering China’s going out strategy has largely been fueled by its demand for natural
resources to keep up with record growth levels, it is valuable to examine the implications of
China through the resource curse framework. This paper attempts to answer the following
question: What are the implications of China’s involvement in developing countries in terms of
the resource curse, and what factors or circumstances determine whether a country will benefit
from these strategic relations with China? The conclusions of this paper are based on the
observation that China’s activity in developing countries involves a complex hybrid of trade,
investment, and aid which is still not entirely understood in some countries. I argue that China
reinforces many of the internal challenges of the resource curse such as corruption, inequality
and institutional rigidity. However in terms of the external challenges, China provides important
economic opportunites to resource-rich countries and represents an alternative to Western
financial institutions such as the IMF. Relative success of resource-rich countries depends upon
initial conditions, type of resource, country size and its ability to effectively negotiate beneficial
terms, investment in productive activity, and responsible fiscal management including the use of
stabilization funds.
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This topic will be of increasing importance as China continues to grow and become
involved in other countries. Not only does China pose significant opportunities and challenges to
developing countries, but it is also changing the global economic community as it begins to take
over roles that have been traditionally dominated by the US and Western institutions. China will
continue to play a larger role in developing countries. Future research should focus on the
sustainability of China’s strategic relations and the ways in which countries can most effectively
use revenues to ensure future prosperity while minimizing the risks associated with the resource
curse.
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